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No one will question the statement that frequently there arises in
the mind of the undergraduate and graduate student the inquiry:
Where and how does this particular day's work fit into the pattern
of thought and learning? Related to this inquiry is a second one:
What are the tests to which this work must be subjected in order to
judge the quality of its truth and worth? The fact that these questions
arise in students' minds has not been given adequate attention by
teachers to whom the training of youth has been entrusted.
If professional people will keep these ideas in mind their own methods
of thought will be improved and they will frequently correlate the
specific task with the larger problem, thus maintaining perspective
for those with whom they work.
The mental concentration necessary to the successful completion
of an immediate problem frequently excludes a grasp of that whole of
which the day's work is a part. Thus perspective in thought, freedom
of spirit, and incentive to enthusiastic action are lost. The exploration
of a single, minute island of thought is likely to delay, if not prevent the
discovery of the archipelago of knowledge. Circumstances and habit
tend to confine our thinking within rather limited areas. It may prove
interesting and profitable to detach our minds from the specific problems
in which we have been interested today and review some of the broad
premises upon which research depends. As a revered graduate school
instructor was accustomed to say: "The review of an old problem
along distinctive avenues of approach is constructive and creative
thinking." I have no hesitancy, therefore, in directing your thought
to an old, yet ever-new problem—"When are we scientific?"
The primary function of this paper is to raise the questions: Is a
scientific method in one field of thought necessarily a scientific method
in another? Are the criteria of scientific quality in one field of learning
the criteria of truth and reality in all fields of learning? My tentative
answer to each of these questions is "No." Are there specific tests of
reality that are intrinsically a part of one field of thought that are not
tests in another field? My answer is "Yes." Furthermore, these tests
are the critical tests of scientific quality in the specific field. The
intent is to direct attention to the fact that scholars researching in
any field become convinced that their thinking and experimenting are
scientifically done. This attitude of mind possesses distinct merit.
Unfortunately they unconsciously draft the corollary that they have
devised the only scientific method. This is an unscientific deduction.
As a mother looking fondly at a passing regiment said: "They are all
out of step but our son Jim."
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The undiscriminating use of the terms science and scientific has
contributed a great deal of confusion to our thinking. The evolution
of the physical, the biological, and the geological sciences has so
dominated thinking that whenever the word "science" is used there is a
connotation that the reference is to one of the above sciences. A
concomitant error is involved in the use of the word "scientific."
Unintentionally the methods of investigation and the criteria of validity
employed by the physical, biological, and geological investigators have
been accepted as inseparably associated with, if not the embodiment of,
scientific thinking. This persistent association of the word scientific
with those sciences in unjustifiable. "He is a scientific thinker" is a
typical use of the word and connotes something infinitely more than
compliance with the techniques of the physical sciences. As thus
used the true meaning is that the worker subjects his information to
those tests of validity that are of the essence of the information with
which he is working, and that he subjects his methods to the tests of
rectitude intrinsically associated with a specific field of thought. These
tests are not necessarily the measures of scientific quality employed in
physics, chemistry, biology, or geology. A deliberate effort should be
made to divorce the word "scientific" from the implied relation to the
sciences: physics, chemistry, biology, and geology, except when desig-
nating the quality of the work done in these subjects. There are
accurate and valid tests of the quality of the information and of the
methods of thinking in history, geography, theology, and philosophy,
that are as scientific for these fields of thought as are the accepted
tests for physics for that subject. That some of the tests are valid in
several fields is a reasonable assumption, but it is just as reasonable to
assume that there are inherent tests for a specific field which are not
common to any other field.
The above use of the phrase "fields of thought" is an attempt to
limit the discussion of the question "When are we scientific" to categories
and thereby simplify the problem. There is an infinite number of
subjects of thought, but since the universities and the colleges have
organized their curricula upon a group or division plan, it is reasonable
to assume that there are inherent likenesses and similarities running
through the subject matter and methods of thinking employed in a
group. If such is the case a list of the tests of scientific quality derived
for a subject such as physics, will be typical of, and applicable to, that
field of thought commonly designated as the Physical Sciences. Further-
more, defining the tests of validity of information and the methods of
thinking in a subject such as geography, in the social science group,
ought to establish the criteria of scientific thinking in the social science
field and thereby define the major criteria of scientific thinking in
history, biography, economics, geography, political science, sociology,
and psychology if it is classed as a social and not a physical science.
Thus the limits of the problem are narrowed and a survey of the question
"When are we scientific" may be confined to two of the five or seven
groups generally outlined in college catalogs.
The primary premise is: Each field of thought possesses criteria of
truth inherent in, and organically a part of it, which are the essential
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measures of its scientific quality, but not necessarily tests of validity in
other groups. If this premise is tenable, then a catalog of the criteria
in each field should be made. Any scholar must accept the tests of
validity recognized in fields other than his own if he wishes to justify
his claim to scholarship in his own field. Furthermore, no one field
of thought can impose its tests upon another field and insist that they
be considered valid tests of truth thereto, unless they give evidence of
belonging organically to the field.
I choose to undertake the study of the following two groups chosen
from the college catalogs, in an effort to list some of the criteria of
scientific quality of each:
1. Physical Sciences: chemistry, mathematics, physics.
2. Social Sciences: including biography, economics, geography,
history, political science, psychology, sociology.
The principles of logic are universal prerequisites of scientific think-
ing. The syllogism, types of terms, definition, and classification, valid
moods and other statistical forms, hypothetical and disjunctive argu-
ments, analogy, and similar principles of reasoning are universal tests
of scientific quality. They are not the specific tests by which scientific
thinking in one field may be differentiated from scientific thinking in
another field. The present quest is for those specific tests of scientific
quality that characterize the physical sciences, but are different from
the tests for the social sciences and all other fields of thought. The
following two discussions attempt to segregate and catalog the tests
for the physical and for the social sciences. It would be folly to claim
that this treatment is exhaustive. The primary intent is to state a
problem in an objective way.
Two lines of investigation have been pursued during the past two
years in the search for definite statements of criteria of scientific quality
of thinking in these two fields.
First: The dissertations presented for the advanced degree of Ph.D.
in various institutions have been examined in search of some principles
which were employed in testing the scientific quality of the research.
It was discovered that the dissertations in any department are confined
to a narrow field, and the dissertations directed by any one man are
restricted to a more limited field. That should be the situation. A
further examination reveals the fact that the method employed in the
original dissertation, probably the director's own dissertation, is prac-
tically duplicated in the successive theses. Similar materials and
identical or analogous circumstances have been introduced, but in
reality there are no fundamental differences between problems. One
of the striking illustrations is in taxonomic problems in biology. All
that is to be found in these theses is an amplification of a problem
previously explored. Such a discovery leads to the conclusion that
well-defined tests of scientific quality have not been consciously
employed, but that a pattern was constructed in the original disserta-
tion and the scientific quality of successive dissertations has been
judged upon the basis of how well they conformed to that pattern. All
such research is commendable and certainly makes valuable contributions
to knowledge.
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The disturbing deduction must be that the "ruling theory" or
"authoritarian method" of thinking has been the dominating test of
scientific quality employed. Strange to relate, this method has been
severely criticised by experts in the physical and biological fields when
employed by investigators in other fields.
This line of investigation did not yield specific statements of criteria
of scientific quality.
A second line of investigation was followed. A search was made in.
the books and journals that discuss methods of research, investigation,
and thesis writing to locate, if possible, the criteria by which the scientific
quality is judged. Brief references are made to the problem in the
books and journals, but no inclusive catalog was found. The books
of logic define clearly the principles of logical thought. However, it
is not logic's function to define the basic criteria of truth and reality,
or the scientific quality of thinking peculiar to a specific field of thought
such as physics or philosophy.
With these two lines of investigation as a background the writer
attempts to develop a brief list of the criteria of scientific quality for
each of two fields: the physical sciences and the social sciences.
Quest number 1—The Physical Sciences:
Each of the so-called fields of thought is concerned in its own way
with the interpretation of the world. Departmentalizing subject
matter and collecting the departments in fields of learning is artificial
and is a response to the limitations of the human mind which demands
that knowledge shall be classified and cataloged. Classifying knowledge
always suggests a simplicity that does not exist, Man thinks in types
which represent ideal conditions. He infers that principles applicable
to the type or type conditions are tests of reality for the group even
into the twilight zone where the group amalgamates with other groups,
or conditions merge with adjacent conditions.
Physics and chemistry deal with materials in terms of constants.
Non-variability is a fundamental consideration to the physical scientist.
He has constructed his method of investigation upon the advantage
that non-variability gives him. In the words of Ritchie, "He assumes,
for instance, that in considering a small portion of the universe he can
neglect all the rest."1 When he has finished with that small bit "He
looks around and brings another small bit of the universe into his ken,,
and continues altering his field of observation until his isolated system
behaves as though it were really isolated. All the time he is able to
leave the whole universe as such, alone; he gets all the advantages he
could have got out of a theory of the universe without the disadvan-
tages."1 Ordinarily he does not attempt a summation and to a
much less degree an integration of the units.
Pure science deals with these isolated units. Probably the only
distinction between pure and applied science is that applied science
is concerned with the relation between the isolated units of pure science.
Out of these inquiries of pure science emerge those criteria that are the
bases for judging the scientific quality of the work.
'Ritchie, A. D., Scientific Method, p. 7.
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Whether a piece of work is scientific or not in the physical sciences
may be measured by the following tests:
1. Has the human factor been eliminated or reduced to a constant
in performing the experiment and in recording results and.
observations?
2. Has the material or the action been resolved into a single
isolated unit? Have the variables been reduced to one?
3. Has simplicity been attained?
4. Have the results been attained by both a direct and indirect
attack, i. e., can the results be secured by a process of elimina-
tion, or as a residium of the solution of associated problems ?
5. Can the results be expressed in a mathematical formula of
quantitative, not descriptive terms? Sumner has said, "Science
is science—only insofar as it is capable of mathematical expres-
sion."2 In the physical sciences, each function in the formula
must be capable of calibration. There are some fields of thought
in which the facts that determine reality are not amenable to-
calibration.
6. Any description of characteristics and interpretation based upon
observation in natural settings must be checked repeatedly and
confirmed in a man-devised experiment.
7. Identical results must be secured by independent investigators-
using the identical methods and materials of the original
investigator.
There are three well-known methods of investigation:
1. The Ruling Theory—Authoritarian.
2. The Working Hypothesis.
5. The Multiple Working Hypotheses.3
The human mind possesses an irrepressible tendency to resist the
invalidation of any explanation of a phenomenon that it has proposed.
The fact that this tendency exists demands that some method of investi-
gation shall be devised that will automatically annul it. Many people
cannot say, "I do not know." They employ the "ruling theory" or
"authoritarian method" in their thinking. This attitude of mind is a
hangover from the day when a scholar could compass the whole of
human knowledge, when most of the information and training were in
possession of a limited few. The scholar then made plausible explana-
tions of phenomena that were readily accepted as true. Thus developed
the "ruling theory" or "authoritarian" process of working. As Emerson
said, "We hate to think"—and hope that some one will save us that
discomfiture by producing a formula for action. The investigator
should be conscious of this tendency and devise methods to render
impossible its practice.
The single hypothesis procedure possesses the same weakness of
permitting men to give undeserved protection to a brain-child.
2Sumner, Frances B., Scientific Monthly, Vol. XXV, No. 4, October, 1937,.
p. 345.
'Journal of Geology, October, November, 1897, Chamberlin, T. C. Vol 5r
No. 8.
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The question naturally arises, Is there any method available which
mechanically eliminates this tendency toward the expression of
prejudice?" If such a device is available it ought to be discovered most
readily in the physical sciences since they deal with the inanimate.
The "multiple working hypotheses method" utilizes the process of
elimination to a high degree, consequently its use might be considered
a criterion of scientific quality in investigation. Any one will acknowl-
edge that building cognate hypotheses is difficult. Nevertheless there
is merit in the severity of the task. As the investigator builds the
several hypotheses he unavoidably discovers new ideas, observes new
conditions and relations that he may not suspect exist when the
authoritarian or single hypothesis method has been employed.
Quest number 2—-The Social Sciences:
Man and man's activities are the central ideas in the social sciences.
These premises must be accepted when a question is raised concerning
the scientific quality of the work done by investigators working in
the field. The central idea is the interpretation of the responses of life
forms to the social and physical environment. In his research work
the historian, the economist, the biographer, the political scientist, is
confronted with more than the immediate environment—he must deal
with the biological heritage, the social heritage, the philosophy* and
experience of the individual as well as of the group of which he is a part.
The period when the major function of the historian, the political
scientist, the economist, and the geographer, was fact finding and the
recording of information is past. That was a very important period
in social science history. The present is a period when interpretation
is the major objective of research. This fact is of supreme importance
and demands major consideration in any attempt to set up standards
of scientific quality for the work done in the social sciences.
The ever-changing, dynamic world doctrine is generally accepted.
This fact demands that some new criteria of truth, inherent in, and
organically a part of the social sciences, must supplement the previously-
accepted tests of the scientific quality of research. Furthermore, it is
absurd to superimpose upon the man-centered social sciences the
tests of validity of mathematics and physics which are primarily con-
cerned with the inanimate. Those tests possess a limited application,
but are not inclusive of all tests nor are they the fundamental ones.
May it be true that students of social sciences, education, philosophy,
and religion permitted themselves to be hurried into changes of pro-
cedure by the success of investigators in the fields of physical science,
biological science, and thereby became imitators when they should
have examined their own premises and developed methods consistent
with the inherent characteristics of their own fields.
Educational statistics exhibit, in a striking degree, the agonizing
efforts a field of learning experiences when it attempts to ape the suc-
cessful technique of another field of learning and to use methods that
are not inherently applicable to itself. The formulae used in statistical
methods in education are not formulae, Their symbols are not the
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language of constants, but of variables that are wholly descriptive—not
definitive. It is quite proper to use these formulae if it is recognized
that the symbols represent descriptive terms. It must be recognized
that they are not mathematical formulae—they just simulate formulae,
hoping thereby to gain greater respectability in an age when an
unjustifiable attempt has been made to subject all scientific quality to
quantitative measures.
Man is a complex organism, the animate and inanimate environment
in which he moves is complex, the parts inseparably interwoven and
integrated—consequently it is impossible to set parts of the environ-
ment or responses off as units by themselves and deal with them as
separate units as is done in the physical sciences. The very nature
of the social sciences precludes the possibility of considering a small
portion of the universe by itself and neglecting all the other parts.
Consequently, we may be compelled to accept the training and character
of the man who makes the interpretation as the best criteria of validity
of thought. If such is the case, we must test the quality of his research
by testing the researcher for his capacity to discover significant informa-
tion and test the quality of that information; for his alertness to existing
conditions, and logical, effective summarizing. Thus we arrive at the
idea that there are at least two measuring scales by which we test the
scientific quality of investigation in the social sciences:
First: We judge the quality of the research by evaluating the
training of the writer. Is he trained in the mechanics of scholarship,
i. e,, trained in paleography, in lexicography, in rhetorical expression;
is he able to analyze his premises and judge whether there is unity and
continuity in his own thought and writing, as well as able to compare
and contrast his work with that of scholars in the identical and similar
fields?
Second: We judge the quality of the research by evaluating the
personal qualities of the worker—his philosophy of life, attitude of
mind, i. e., his sympathies, enthusiasms, personal interests, prejudice,
envy, malice, his experience in the world of reality, and his ability to live
successfully with men. This group of tests in reality is a test of the
character of the worker.
The experience of the worker in the social sciences is a major test
of the scientific quality of his work. There are two types of experience:
actual and vicarious. To a degree it is possible for a geographer to be
so thoroughly informed concerning the habitations, the tools, the
religion, the social customs of a human group living a life of isolation
in a dissected upland that he becomes a part of a Scottish clan that he
may live, to a degree, the life of Scott's Roderick in the "Lady of the
Lake," or, he may visualize the life of the mountaineer of our Appa-
lachians until he can approximate the feud, blood-retribution spirit of
the Hatfields and McCoys. However, his vicarious living can only
approximate reality and the approximation of the reader of his descrip-
tion will be of lesser degree. The fact is that the vicarious experience
of the reader of the geographer's interpretation can never equal actual
experience. There is no subjectivity that can possibly replace objective
experience.
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It is difficult for us to accept these tests as criteria of scientific
quality of the geographer's and economist's work simply because we
have become so greatly enamored of the quantitative methods of the
physical sciences and are suspicious of qualitative tests. Nevertheless,
they are the specific tests of scientific quality in the social sciences
simply because they are of the very essence of them.
The tests of scientific quality in the social sciences are at the extreme
opposite pole from the tests of scientific quality in the physical sciences.
They express a contrast that naturally exists.
In summary: Students classify their knowledge in compartments
that have been designated fields of thought. In all classifications it is
the ideal, representative subject matter and ideal method of thinking-
that are considered when the particular field is named. Little if any
thought is given to the zone where one field passes indistinguishably
into another field. There is subject matter and there are methods of
treating information that are common to all the fields of learning.
There are tests of scientific quality that are common to several, but not
to all fields. The significant fact is that there are a few tests that
are the specific tests of validity in a particular field and these are the
tests that should be given the greatest weight in evaluating the scientific
quality of the studies in that field. Helmholtz acknowledged the
existence of this idea when he pleaded for an increased and closer
connection of the points of view of the various sciences especially
when these dealt with the same subject or similar subjects.4
If these specific differences can be clearly defined, scholars will have
at their command the tools by which to judge scientific quality.
Definitions can be made and when they are made scholars in any field
will have at their command criteria by which to judge the work in that
field. Possibly the day may come when the physical scientist will not
accuse a worker in the field of philosophy and religion of being
unscientific because he has not employed the tests of physics and
chemistry in his work. When these definitions are made then students
are going to acquire a finer appreciation of one another's work; are
going to be more sympathetic with one another's endeavors; and .are
going to be more scientific in their appreciation of the whole rather
than parts of knowledge.
This brief review of a problem is presented with the hope that
other analyses may be offered and that both graduate and under-
graduate students may be aided in their quests for statements of tests
of scientific quality of investigation.
4Jones, W. Tudor, Contemporary Thought of Germany, p. 129.
